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POLICY PAPER: 
NETHERLANDS  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Outsourcing in itself does not need to be problematic for collective bargaining 
coverage. Transportation of goods, for example, is a service that has a long 
history of being outsourced, but also has a sectoral collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) that is habitually extended to cover the entire sector. This 
means outsourced truck drivers are by definition covered by a CBA, whereas 
truck drivers employed for example by a chemical processing company without 
a company CBA are not. This does not mean there are no problems, however. In 
this study we encountered numerous examples of CBA ‘gaps’ and ‘clashes’, 
related in differing degrees to the phenomenon of outsourcing. 
First of all, we encountered several employer strategies that lead to lower CBA 
coverage. For a company, coverage by a sectoral CBA is determined by the 
activity that accounts for the largest share of profits. One strategy we 
encountered is for companies to split up their activities into several legal 
entities, e.g. into transport and logistical services, which removes the logistical 
workers from the scope of the transport CBA. Another example is ‘CBA 
shopping’, in which a company self-identifies with a sector with low CBA 
standards, or identifies new groups of workers as falling in a category with 
lower CBA standards. Finally, hiring workers through temporary work 
agencies (TWAs) or subcontracting self-employed workers allows employers to 
avoid coverage of CBAs. These strategies, however, are not restricted to 
situations of outsourcing. 
A problem more closely related to the outsourcing phenomenon arises from the 
fact that outsourcing is not seldom motivated by costs. In non-organised sectors 
in which only minimum wage applies, there is very little incentive for 
employers to negotiate anything above it, which would harm their ability to 
compete. Cost pressures are intensified by the temporary nature of outsourcing 
contracts, providers having to tender or renegotiate contracts periodically. Not 
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only are they competing against their competitors in these situations, but also 
against their clients’ ability to insource more cheaply. 
The pressure on costs only exacerbates more institutional barriers to collective 
bargaining in relatively ‘new’ sectors that have been developing partially as a 
result of outsourcing. Trade unions lag behind in organisational structure and 
resources being targeted at these sectors. Also, social partners are often 
reluctant to identify a new sector for collective bargaining as it might impinge 
on already existing sectors, putting at risk their ability to extend sectoral CBAs. 
This policy paper elaborates on and gives examples of these problems as they 
were encountered for the activities studied in the Netherlands: logistical 
services, employment services, and services provided by a facility management 
company. It furthermore expounds on social partner efforts to address these 
issues, and offers some policy recommendations. 
 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RECKONING WITH 
OUTSOURCING 
 
1. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE 
Collective bargaining coverage among the overall Dutch working population 
remains high, consistently hovering around 80% of employees. The dominant 
level of collective bargaining is the sectoral level and coverage follows 
employer organisation. If employer association’s party to a sectoral CBA can 
prove that they cover at least 55% of the workforce in that sector, it may be 
extended to cover the entire sector by ministerial decree. Extension is common 
in many sectors and an important incentive for employers to negotiate a CBA: a 
CBA without extension opens the way for competition on labour costs. 
Extended sectoral CBAs are also found in sectors of commonly outsourced 
services such as transport and cleaning. Outsourcing therefore does not 
necessarily lead to less coverage. Problems arise where ‘new’ sectors develop 
that lack the tradition and institutions for collective bargaining and where 
employers are doubtful about the prospect of a CBA’s extension. In all three 
activities investigated for this study, we may indeed speak of such a new sector: 
logistical services (which used to be more integrated with transport or with the 
producers or sellers of goods), employment services (which used to be a public 
service), and facility management (which is a hybrid of multiple traditional 
sectors plus some grey areas). 
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2.  THE EXTENSION, REGULATION AND FORMS OF OUTSOURCING 
Outsourcing now occurs both ‘first generation’, i.e. an activity is placed outside 
of an organisation which used to do it itself, and ‘second generation’, i.e. an 
organisation seeks a new contractor for an already outsourced activity. In first 
generation outsourcing, Transfer of Undertaking legislation generally applies, 
although trade unions have encountered cases in which this was successfully 
challenged by the employer. When it is applied, workers have the right to 
choose between continuing coverage under whatever CBA used to apply, but 
without the improvements negotiated after outsourcing, or falling under the 
newly applicable CBA (if there is one). In all outsourcing, the Combating 
Fraudulent Employment Act (WAS in Dutch) applies, which holds contracting 
parties responsible for the correct payment of labour when contractors and 
subcontractors fail to do so. This applies to wages and social contributions as 
well as redundancy payments and payments following bankruptcy.  
In more ‘micro’ forms of outsourcing such as hiring workers through TWAs 
and subcontracting self-employed workers, things are somewhat different. 
TWA workers are covered by a TWA sectoral CBA, which stipulates that wages 
must be equal to what direct employees in the client company earn. They do 
not, however, benefit from other conditions negotiated for that company such 
as a pension plan. Also, many rights only kick in after a certain period of time 
in the company. As for self-employed subcontractors, CBAs cannot apply 
because they are entrepreneurs. 
  
3.  FACILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 
Three sectoral CBAs apply to sections of facility management (FM): those for 
cleaning, catering, and security1. Employees who do not fall in one of these 
three categories are not covered. The CBAs include employment protection 
clauses for situations of changes of contract, ensuring that employees meeting 
certain criteria will be taken over by the new contractor. Besides the CBAs, the 
social partners in these sectors plus the moving sector have formulated the 
Responsible Market Behaviour Code, which will be elaborated on later.  
 
 
                                                          
1 The first two have been extended, the third likely will. 
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OUTSOURCED ACTIVITIES AND FACILITY 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY CASE 
 
1. LOGISTICAL SERVICES 
Logistical services as studied in this project comprise services such as 
warehousing and distribution. Important clients are companies in 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail. Employment in logistics comprised about 
5% of employment (478.000 persons) in the Netherlands in 2014, of whom 
roughly 20% were outsourced and 80% performed these activities in-house. 
Outsourcing of these services started some thirty years ago and has steadily 
increased, though it is unclear whether this trend is continuing. 
The majority of in-house logistical workers are covered by the numerous 
sectoral and company CBAs in manufacturing, wholesale and retail. On the 
contrary, only a small share of outsourced workers is covered by either a 
company-level agreement or the sectoral transport and logistics CBA, which 
only covers logistics workers when they are employed by a transport company 
which also offers logistical services. This CBA reflects the earlier situation in 
which transport and logistics were integrated in the larger transport companies, 
but employers’ splitting up these activities into different legal entities has 
reduced logistical workers’ coverage. Despite attempts by social partners to 
organise logistical services as a new sector, the difficulty to come up with a 
comprehensive definition of the sector without impinging on existing sectors 
has made the prospect of extension of a logistical services CBA too unlikely for 
employers to be willing to organise. 
Trade unions also face several challenges. The high share of temporary and 
TWA workers, periodic expiration of contracts between suppliers and 
contractors, and fragmentation of workers along a service chain make it 
difficult to organise workers. Cost pressures furthermore pose the risk that if 
working conditions are improved in one company along the chain, these will be 
offset in another part of the chain or the contract will not be renewed in favour 
of a cheaper competitor. Where workers are organised out of companies that 
fall in traditional sectors, either through splitting off activities or through 
outsourcing, workers end up in a ‘no man’s land’ from the unions’ perspective 
because there are no organisational structures targeting this ‘new’ sector.  
Underlining that outsourcing itself is not always the problem, we found several 
examples of ‘CBA shopping’ by companies which conduct their own logistics. 
A relatively new online retailer applies the sectoral retail CBA to both its 
drivers and logistical workers, whereas drivers would be better off under the 
transport CBA. A large supermarket chain which has a separate (and more 
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favourable) CBA for its logistics workers does not apply it to its logistical 
workers in the distribution centres for online order fulfilment, claiming that it is 
a new and different activity from the one the logistics CBA was bargained for. 
 
2. EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
In the Netherlands, employment services, defined in this study as labour 
market (re)integration support, are provided by the Public Employment 
Agency (UWV), municipalities, and private companies. An estimated 11,000 
persons provide these services within the public providers (UWV and 
municipalities) and are covered by the applicable CBAs. An estimated 37,000 
persons work for private companies, which are nearly always contracted by 
UWV, municipalities and employers, and are therefore outsourced. There is no 
CBA in the private part of this sector. The only persons covered are those 
working for the several large TWAs with company-level CBAs which have 
devoted departments to such services. 
The private part of the sector originated after employment services were 
privatised in the 1990s and public providers were required to purchase these 
services from private providers. Purchasing was later limited when public 
bodies were again allowed to provide services themselves and restrictions were 
placed on situations in which purchasing services were allowed, related to 
severe budget cuts for employment services in 2005 and 2011. Such 
developments severely impact both employment levels and coverage dynamics 
for this activity: the more public bodies provide the services, the more people in 
this activity are covered by a CBA. However, the increased use of public-private 
initiatives, regional cooperation for social service provision, and the use of 
payrolling by municipalities pose challenges to coverage in the public part of 
the sector too. 
On the employer side, a branch association exists which was originally 
established to support the new private employers in tendering procedures and 
later added a hallmark to raise quality standards in the new ‘wild west’-like 
sector. It now provides certification for its members and functions as a lobby 
association for employers in employment services more broadly (including for 
example health and safety). So far, it has not engaged in collective bargaining 
for a sectoral CBA. The diversity of members (from large TWAs to specialised 
SMEs), the existence of company CBAs for TWAs, and the coverage of a 
handful of companies by the sectoral care CBA are likely inhibiting factors. 
For trade unions, the high number of SMEs and self-employed persons poses a 
challenge to organising the private part of this sector. Companies also make 
much use of temporary and self-employed workers to match the fluctuations in 
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work following from tendering. The fragmented distribution of workers across 
public, private, and semi-public segments of the economy further limit trade 
unions’ overview over the sector. 
 
3. FACILITY MANAGEMENT COMPANY 
The largest FM companies offering multi-services have become important 
employers, together employing nearly 30,000 persons in the Netherlands. The 
majority of their employees are covered by two extended sectoral CBAs: the 
cleaning CBA and contract catering CBA. The security services CBA could 
apply to some of their activities as well, but only if it is extended. 
In order to deal with the administrative burden of multiple applicable CBAs, 
the company in our case study has organised its activities subject to different 
CBAs under different legal entities, so that each legal entity is covered by one 
CBA (i.e. either cleaning or catering; it does not offer security services itself), 
which is common practice among the large FM companies. Activities that do 
not fall under any of these CBAs such as reception services, ‘hybrid’ activities, 
and higher management positions are again organised in separate legal entities.  
This means that within the same FM company and on a single work site, 
employees are working under different employment conditions. Although the 
differences in wages are small, even for those not covered by a CBA, workers 
without coverage do not benefit from the employment protection clauses in the 
CBAs that protect workers when the FM company loses a contract. The 
separation into multiple legal entities also poses a challenge for potential job 
upgrading: if a cleaner performs tasks beyond the scope of cleaning, the 
company may have to enter into an additional contract with the worker under a 
different legal entity, complicating the employment relationship and calculation 
of wages and other payments, which makes them reluctant to do so. 
A potential solution for differentiated working conditions is a single employer 
CBA. This was rejected by the employer in our case study because it is 
complicated to apply for an exemption from the sectoral CBAs and the 
company CBA would have to improve on conditions in both CBAs, making it 
difficult to remain cost-competitive. The alternative, a sectoral CBA for the 
‘new’ FM sector, was rejected because they are reluctant to share too much 
information with the handful of large FM companies that constitute the sector, 
and because of the fear of impinging on the existing sectors. The existence of 
extended sectoral CBAs therefore on the one hand forms a powerful tool for 
protection of outsourced workers, but at the same time inhibits the inclusion of 
workers outside the scope of these sectors. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
One promising strategy employed by the largest Dutch trade union is for union 
officials to cooperate along supply or service chains. This helps to identify the 
most powerful party in a chain to negotiate with, which is usually the end user 
of the services, as they ultimately set the prices and are generally more sensitive 
to public pressure. In some cases it has also allowed for coalition-forming 
between unions and employers in the chain to jointly put pressure on end users. 
One way to do this is calling out the end user on the WAS: large client 
companies have proven to be responsive because they are weary of negative 
media attention and they wish to avoid costs they would incur if a contractor or 
subcontractor goes bankrupt. Legislating such responsibility therefore has 
significant potential to affect tariff-setting and improving working conditions. 
A more collaborative approach was found in the formulation of a Code for 
Responsible Market Behaviour. It is a voluntary code of conduct initiated by the 
social partners in the cleaning sector, together with a number of large public 
and semi-public clients, to counter the pressure on costs. It sets out guidelines 
for both contractors and contracting parties to stimulate socially responsible 
tendering and contracting practices. In its first 7.5 years of existence, it has been 
signed by nearly 1400 signatories, including companies in FM and its 
constituting sectors, client companies, trade unions, and advisors and brokers 
in FM. Its strengths are its comprehensive reach, addressing the entire service 
chain, and the collaborative effort across sectoral boundaries. Its main 
weaknesses are the lack of a legal status, the only available sanctions for 
breaking the code being public shaming, and the limited availability of control 
mechanisms. 
This study has shown how sectoral CBAs, especially habitually extended ones, 
have a strong path-dependency effect as they consolidate sectoral boundaries in 
their own definition of the sector: trade unions organise their organisational 
structure around them and the extension requirements make social partners 
reluctant to redraw the borders of a sector for fear of no longer meeting the 
requirements. This inhibits both redrawing existing sectoral lines and defining 
new sectors, which means that newly emerging sectors in the economy are 
vulnerable to CBA-lessness. This was seen in logistical services, employment 
services, and the integrated FM services. In order to address the rigidity of these 
sectoral lines, it may be useful to reconsider the requirements for extension, 
making it easier, for example, to apply for extension, or allowing for 
exemptions for subsectors without affecting the representativeness of existing 
CBAs. This may also remove some of the reluctance of employers to organise 
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new sectors for fear of not achieving an extension. 
What the above examples have in common is that in order to improve CBA 
coverage in a setting in which the sectoral level of collective bargaining is 
dominant, it is necessary for social dialogue institutions to mirror the emerging 
structures in the economy. When new sectors emerge out of privatisation, 
outsourcing, specialisation (splitting up activities into different legal entities), or 
new economic activities (e.g. e-commerce), social partners can more effectively 
approach them if their own organisational structures and instruments (such as 
the Code for Responsible Market Behaviour, hallmarks, and any other 
instruments) address the actual structures and employment relationship as they 
exist in the market, rather than adhering to traditional sectors. Finally, CBAs in 
frequently outsourced sectors would be well-advised to address the temporary 
nature of most contracts, for example by including employment protection 
clauses, or include stipulations for temporary and TWA workers who are 
frequently hired as the employers’ response to the temporary nature of 
contracts. 
